Task Force Stryker
Network Revolution
by Captain Jonathan Pan

"To defeat a network, you have to be a network."

General Stanley A. McChrystal
Commander, International Security Assistance Force and
Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan

In counterinsurgencies, the most difficult thing to understand is the nature of the conflict. The military is very self-referential with the outside world. Soldiers tend to see the world through a military lens. When a soldier sees hills, he thinks key terrain: an area the seizure or retention of which affords a marked advantage to either combatant. When an agronomist sees hills, he sees the principal water catchment area and the need for elevated irrigation canals. A decentralized civilian-military network reveals a complete picture of the "whole world" which leads to better decision making. Having decentralized networks within a structured hierarchy such as the military brings a certain amount of chaos and ambiguity in exchange for innovation.

5th Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, also known as Task Force Stryker, has sought to develop in its key leaders and staff the ability to see the "whole world." This was accomplished through multiple Human Dimension leadership development programs away from Fort Lewis, which is where the unit was based. Implicit in this approach was the intent to get away from the military world and put them in a different environment. Many of the programs were not about war at all; they were about humans enduring through challenging situations.

This was surprising to some because Stryker brigades have been called "the most lethal and agile formation on any battlefield anywhere."[114] Lethality and agility are necessary but not sufficient to winning a counterinsurgency. A sufficient characteristic is having decentralized networks. General Martin Dempsey, Commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, spoke about "networked decentralized organizations, and how hierarchical organizations have a very difficult time encountering them" and how the Army is moving towards an organization that is "more trust than control."[115]

Task Force Stryker (TFS) is one of the most technologically networked brigades in the United States Army. It is the first brigade to deploy with land warrior, "a modular fighting system that uses state-of-the-art computer, communications, and global positioning technologies to digitally link soldiers on the battlefield. The system is integrated with the Soldier's body armor and has a helmet-mounted display."[116]

TFS soldiers even have the unprecedented ability to be linked directly with fighter pilots. Beyond the flashing icons and flickering screens resides an unseen decentralized network: the fusion cells.

There are six fusion cells within TFS: Tactical, Population and Resource Control, Advisory, Intelligence, Special Operation Forces, and Governance, Reconstruction, and Development (GR&D). Each fusion cell is a working group where various staff members come together to address issues specific to that cell. Fusion cells are decentralized networks. Issues are not given to traditional staff elements, but managed by a problem-oriented team. It is a highly effective way to flatten the staff and achieve a multidisciplinary cross-pollination of ideas and holistic solutions. There was a reason why Major Michael Gephart was chosen to be in charge of all the fusion cells. He used to work in the Special Forces (SF) community, which are the very definition of decentralized networks. SF usually works in twelve-man Operational Detachments Alpha (ODAs) which can be deployed anywhere to do anything. That is why he personally brought two capacities central to decentralized organizations to

---

[114] Gilbert, Michael. "Stryker brigade readies for war" The News Tribune May 5, 2007 http://www.thenewstribune.com/356/story/55324.html

[115] Moore, Karl. "Talking Management: Leadership message from a four-star general" The Globe and Mail Aug 14, 2009 http://www.army.mil/-news/2009/08/14/26059-talking-management-leadership-message-from-a-four-star-general/

[116] Dawson, Debi. "Army to Equip Brigade with 'Land Warrior'" Army News Service May 28, 2008 http://www.army.mil/-news/2008/05/28/9450-army-to-equip-brigade-with-land-warrior/

the fusion cells: anyone can do anything and anyone can be invited to fusion cell meetings.

TFS's *Long Range Strategy* emphasizes excellence in planning. To this end, TFS established a GR&D fusion cell with the objective of collaborating with similar organizations already in existence in Kandahar Province, specifically the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team. The Brigade Commander's vision stated that "Once the capability of Governance, Reconstruction, and Development Fusion Cell is understood others will seek to work with it."

These words have been prophetic because recently a United States Department of Agriculture representative switched over from another organization just to work alongside TFS. Furthermore, there are many other civilians at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul who are starting to hear about TFS and have contacted the GR&D fusion cell to collaborate on future projects. In the business world, they would probably call this branding. Branding leads to increased perceived value and builds trust. TFS is a centralized company that decentralizes the customer experience. Its customers range from the American Public, to International Actors, and to the Afghan people. Every customer not only receives products and services but the help shape the formation and delivery of these products and services. For instance, before TFS executes any major project, there will be deliberations with the Provincial Reconstruction Team, the USG regional platform, Afghan Provincial and District Leaders, as well as Tribal Leaders. Having so many moving pieces for one activity highlights the lack of visibility for the tactical commanders, which requires an unprecedented level of trust which is necessary in small wars.

Building the Trust for the Revolution

Building a hybrid model with the coexistence of the structure and control of the military as well as the chaos and ambiguity of a decentralized network requires trust. This required a two-prong approach: building the capacity of the network to accept chaos as well as empowering people. The Commander of TFS, Colonel Harry D. Tunnell IV, made it work because he empowered people and got out of the way and then championed the ability of junior officers to express their views in a hierar-

chical system.[117] This was challenging to say the least because the military perceives decentralized networks not only as ineffective, but dangerous.[118]

Seven months before deployment, he sent a young company grade officer throughout the greater Seattle region to build networks. While attending a six-month course called "Creating a Company" at the University of Washington, the young officer was introduced to the Keiretsu Forum and the Northwest Entrepreneur Network. The Keiretsu Forum is the world's largest angel investor network with 750 accredited investor members throughout eighteen chapters on three continents. The Northwest Entrepreneur Network is a 700 member strong organization that is dedicated to helping the entrepreneurship community in the Northwest.

The course led by Dr. John Castle, was the only one of its kind in the world where students teamed up to form companies with start-up funding from the Michael G. Foster School of Business. TF's young officer started up a company with two other students called Pristine Polishing, which provides eco-friendly yacht detailing. Indirectly, he learned how to ensure that contractors would not be able to gouge him on prices. In Afghanistan, there is a serious issue of Coalition Forces paying too much for projects and a lack of oversight. Sending off a young company grade officer into Seattle for six months required a tremendous amount of trust.

Furthermore, TFS considered mobile phone banking for the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) with the Chief Executive Officer of a leading provider of mobile information solutions. He explained how companies have tried this in Kenya and the Philippines with mixed results. These companies would basically have nodes, such as small grocery shops, which can receive text messages from the bank to confirm credit or withdraw-

---

[117] Brafman, Ori and Rod A. Beckstrom. The Starfish and the Spider. New York: Penguin, 2006.
[118] Clegg, Neil. Private Conversation. Kandahar Airfield, November 12, 2009.

Satisfied customers: Even the dog is pleased with our work!

al of funds once their customers sent a text message to the bank. However, the fundamental issue still remained: the nodes needed cash eventually and these companies existed due to the remoteness or lack of security of these population centers. Based on this experience, TFS was able to eliminate that as a potential solution before arrival in sector and concentrate on establishing security and telecommunication support for automated teller machines (ATMs) instead. ANSF were being wounded or killed on their way to the Kabul Bank ATM in Kandahar City to draw their wages. They have to use Kabul Bank because this is where the Ministry of Interior transfers their wages. There was only one Kabul Bank ATM in all of Kandahar Province. The GR&D fusion cell sent a representative to meet with the Chief Operations Officer of Kabul Bank in order to convince him to open up a new branch.

This networking was not limited to the business world. Anticipating the need for road experts in a country with mobility issues, two University of Washington Engineering professors were contacted: Joe Mahoney (an ex-Air force officer) and Steve Muench (an ex- Navy officer). They created Pavement Interactive, an internet-based collaborative space that for all things pavement. This network enables TFS to execute pavement projects in the absence of road experts. Furthermore, a law professor named Clark Lombardi led to the introduction of Barnett Rubin, one of the foremost experts on Afghanistan, and his yahoo group comprised of 1,459 experts and other interested persons on Afghanistan.

This decentralized network was tested during TFS's National Training Center rotation, where brigades train before their deployment, with a re-

quest for information on current wages for a day's worth of unskilled labor in southern Afghanistan. Within twenty-four hours, the latest data from all sorts of government officials, U.S. and Afghan, was obtained. Pre-deployment activities of the GR&D fusion cell developed the capacity of its members to operate as a decentralized network. This has paid dividends once the unit arrived in theatre and started to expand its networks and relationships with its civilian partners. The network revolution has begun.

Expanding the Network

The concept of coordinated civilian-military strategy development and planning has been relatively new yet widely successful in Regional Command South, Afghanistan.

To clarify the alphabet soup that is the civil-military world, the civil-military cell of the Regional Command South will be referred to as the "CIVMIL cell," the Civil Military Cooperation shop will be referred to as the "CJ9." The CJ9 focused on provincial level partners while the CIVMIL cell focused on regional and national level partners. The CIVMIL cell stood up in December 2008. The cell's mandate is to develop a regional comprehensive integrated civil-military strategy. Thereafter, The United States Government (USG) Civilian Platform was stood up in August 2009. The platform's mandate is to achieve USG and ultimately coalition unity of effort through the pursuit of an integrated civil-military strategy.

TFS arrived in sector (Kandahar and Zabul Province) in July 2009. Within a month of arriving, the CIVMIL cell hosted a lessons learned session with briefings by the Civil-Military Operations shop of Marine Expeditionary Brigade-Afghanistan as well as members of the CIVMIL cell. The Marines have been operating in neighboring Helmand Province since June 2009. Lieutenant Colonel Curtis Lee of the Marines, gave an extensive overview of all the civil-military activities and programs that existed, from the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation's National Solidarity Program to the Independent Directorate of Local Governance's Afghan Social Outreach Program, and how best to integrate these into the commander's intent.

For a whole month, the CIVMIL cell as well as their next door neighbor, the CJ9 shop introduced all the various civil-military players in the region. Needless to say, TFS's network expanded enormously during this month. At first, the GR&D fusion cell relied heavily on the only two military officers in the CIVMIL cell at that time, First Lieutenant Russell Grant and Navy Lieutenant Joshua

Welle. Their departure however was not without benefit as it forced the GR&D fusion cell to expand their networks to the civilian members of the CIV-MIL cell, with as varied backgrounds as Jason Lewis-Berry of the State Department, Bernard Haven of Canadian International Development Agency, and Marcus Knuth, of the Danish Embassy in Kabul.

Shortly thereafter, TFS added two civilians to its ranks: the experienced Todd Greentree of the Department of State, with Afghanistan being his fifth duty post in an irregular conflict, following El Salvador 1980–83, the Bougainville Rebellion, Papua New Guinea 1987–88, the People Power Revolution and Maoist insurgency in Nepal 1990–93, the death of Jonas Savimbi and the termination of the Angolan civil war 1999–2002, and Neil Clegg, a former Canadian Army officer and veteran of 27 years in Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Mr. Greentree served as the senior civilian to TFS and Mr. Clegg as the liaison between Canadian Task Force Kandahar to TFS on stabilization and development issues.

During early engagements, Task Force Stryker considered its embedded civilians as "enablers" of its military objectives. Soon, there was a realization that their capabilities went far beyond "enabling" the unit to achieve its military objectives. By treating them as full partners in the full spectrum of the planning process, they showed on specific occasions a strong ability to be creative and innovative in the planning process. Their forte was manifested in their conceptual skills. On the other hand, the military was adept at structuring frameworks and turning plans into deliverable communication, such as fragmentation or operation orders. Also, the military is one of the premier organizations that can move thousands of personnel and pieces of equipment around. TFS used its civilians' decades of experience in a kaleidoscopic range of fields to build its own capacity and expand its networks.

Practical Applications for Tactical Commanders

Fighting a war in a coalition is a complex undertaking. However, Regional Command South's fifteen contributing nations lengthens the decision making process. Capitals need to be contacted and deliberations take time because the ultimate decision makers are often in Kabul, Washington, Ottawa, or London. Two practical applications of utilizing the civil-military network are for drafting strategic overview plans as well as making use of the

civilian hierarchy. One of the first things TFS found itself dealing with was the drafting of the Kandahar Coordination Plan, "a comprehensive approach to synchronizing and coordinating the military and civilian activities of Canada and the U.S. in Kandahar province for one year."[119]

Deliberating the nuances of one word versus another is not a military forte. However, to ensure that these strategic level plans maintain their focus, it is important to be precise. This is one area where civilians have substantial expertise. Mr. Greentree served with Task Force Warrior in Regional Command East and Mr. Clegg has served as both a Canadian Army Officer and business development planner. With decades of experience in their respective diplomatic services as well as first-hand military experience, they played an invaluable role in translating doctrinal military text into plain language.

Strategic overview plans define the joint intent of senior military and civilian leaders. They serve to maintain a common strategic direction, while not inhibiting subordinate commanders' tactical freedom of action. Consistent with the task of shared civil-military strategic vision, TFS started District-level planning sessions in October. The intent was to achieve unity of effort between the battle-space owners and civilian counterparts at the district level to achieve a unity of effort and identify areas where the brigade or higher can support.

Preparing these strategic plans has been an iterative process. The process of developing the first District Stabilization Plan (Arghandab) was fraught with difficulty stemming from inexperience, lack of focus on desired end states, and lack of adequate preparatory action done by the inputting individual planners. The first planning session lasted almost six hours and ended when the participants reached a state of fatigue. It was only through the superb individual efforts of Mr. Lewis-Berry, the Chief of Staff of the Senior Civilian to Regional Command South, in providing a coherent summation of the day's discussions the process was able to be continued. The lessons learned from the first session were the need for: a clear agenda, a focused participants list, a list of shared or common objectives, and a clear expectation for preparation and follow up. These were all necessary to have towards a meaningful and efficient commencement of a consultative strategic planning process

---

[119] Kandahar Action Plan, August 21, 2009: 1

Feeling the way forward, the second session in Spin Boldak, which is separated from Kandahar Airfield by eighty kilometers and not nearly as familiar to the participants, took only four hours and produced a much more concise, focused, and substantial end product in terms of its identification of crucial areas of interest and desired one-year and three-year end states. The lessons learned from this process were the need for identifying areas where there were crucial gaps in critical intelligence. These gaps were essential and had to be addressed quickly and substantially.

Having parallel civilian-military hierarchies can be useful to tactical commanders. For examples, requests for humanitarian assistance packages through the Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) were consistently held up at the United States Forces Afghanistan level. The GR&D fusion cell encountered roadblocks while going through the military's chain of command. It was much easier for Mr. Greentree to call a two-star equivalent civilian who could help influence the situation. The USG Civilian Platform seems to have a horizontal rather than a vertical reporting chain. Aside from the practical applications of employing the network for various tasks that the military is less competent with, civilian partners play a role in seeing the "whole world" picture which leads to better decision making.

The Value of Different Perspectives

TFS values different perspectives from different agencies, branches and nations because it leads to better decision making. In October, thirty-one participants from a diversity of networks were invited to a District Planning Session in Spin Boldak. The participants hailed from agencies such as the United States Army Corps of Engineers, Regional Command South CIVMIL cell, Human Terrain Team, United States Agency for International Aid and Development's (USAID) Office of Transition Initiatives, Spin Boldak's Border Coordination Center, Task Force Kandahar, Combined Joint Interagency Task Force Anzio, Kandahar Intelligence Fusion Cell, United States Department of Agriculture, Department of State, 8th Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment and others.

The planning session focused on one-year and three-year end states. The unit focused on the one-year plan, which centered on ANSF-led persistent security for select model villages which led to a stabilization and then development of those population centers. Mr. Lewis-Berry emphasized the

need for the three-year plan. Civilians attached to the maneuver battalions often tend to align their views with the battalions or with their own personal expertise (the agriculture expert will usually advocate for agriculture), which is why it was important to bring brigade and regional command level civilian partners to emphasize the long view.

Having regional command level planners ensured that the unit's plan synchronized with the regional plan. Ultimately, the three-year plan centered on the fact that major regional projects and programs will result in an increased supply of agricultural products coming from the Helmand and Arghandab River Valleys that will exceed regional demand, which will result in the export through Spin Boldak to Pakistan. These major projects and programs include but are not limited to USAID's $240M Afghanistan Vouchers for Increased Production of Agriculture Plus (AVIPA Plus) program (increase in agricultural output), the Dahla Dam project (increase in irrigation of the Arghandab River Valley), and the installation of the third generator in Kajaki Dam (increase in electricity). The regional plan depends on movement along all phases of the value chain. Spin Boldak will rightfully so be on the storage, processing, and packaging portion of the value chain.

The value chain is an important concept for the Commander of TFS, because he sees beyond single, isolated projects. Understanding the value chain is understanding the whole picture. Agriculture is the defining economic driver of Regional Command South. It does not solely depend on the farmer, "there needs to be effective integration between retailers, sales and marketing agents, distributors, transporters, processors, merchants


Planners deliberating during the Spin Boldak Planning Session in FOB Spin Boldak

and producers."[120] Therefore, to really improve stability or economic development, the whole spectrum of the value chain needs to be developed.

The lines between all levels of war have been blurred by the nature of small wars. It takes an adaptable and fast-learning organization to exploit any situation. Aside from Provincial (Brigade) and District (Battalion) level planning, the GR&D fusion cell has actually facilitated population-center level planning (Company). Combat Outpost Rath, which is occupied by Bravo Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry Regiment (2-1 IN) is located within the center of the largest population center in Maiwand District.

Eighteen people were present for this planning session to include the Police Mentoring Team Leader from the 4th Brigade, 82nd Infantry Division, the Battalion's Department of State representative, the Battalion Executive Officer, two Asymmetric Warfare Group representatives, the Civil Affairs Team, the Battalion Information Operations Officer, the Battalion Non-lethal Coordinator, the Center for Army Lessons Learned liaison officer to TFS, the Brigade Economic Development Officer, the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team's Agriculture representative, all the Platoon leaders, the Company Executive Officer, and finally the Company Commander.

This planning session was an example of the decentralized network being utilized. Various partners usually working at the regional command or higher level were called upon to plan at the provincial level one week and the company level the next. The session concluded with a lead identified on every project. For example, USAID will concentrate on service and

Sample Value Chain Continuum

technical contracts, the Civil Affairs Team will concentrate on infrastructure projects, and the Brigade will focus on getting regional level assets down to the company. Every identified project was targeted at addressing a specific grievance. To identify grievances, TFS uses the Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework, which is a tool to help understand a part of the world that both the civil-military side has just recently begun to see. The next evolution of these planning sessions

Planning Session at Combat Outpost Rath, October, 2009

---

[120] Upper Quartile, "RC(S) Agriculture Development Review" July 2009: 10

would be to include district or provincial level officials.

A Vehicle for Understanding the Whole Picture

The Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework (TCAPF) is designed as a systematic approach to getting the whole picture which leads to the identification and mitigation of grievances. Grievances make frustrated people, who then pick up guns and shoot others. Dr. Jim Derleth of USAID, the creator of TCAPF, always uses the example that there are a billion people living under a dollar wage per day, yet they do not all pick up guns and shoot people. Therefore, the notion of poverty being tied to an insurgency is misguided. The opposite of grievances are resiliencies. Resiliencies are governmental and societal capability and capacity to resist grievances. Conventional military targeting usually ignores the sources of resiliencies which can often help the mission more than killing a high value target. An example is an influential school teacher who told all his children and their parents that improvised explosive devices (IEDs) hurt their children and their community. IEDs went down 30% in the next month.

TCAPF has five phases which are Collection, Analysis, Design, Implementation, and Evaluation. Collection is done at the squad level with the use of their standardized questionnaire with four questions. The first question is, "Have there been changes in the village population in the last year?" The second question is, "What are the most important problems facing the village?" The third question is "Who do you believe can solve your problems?" The fourth question is, "What should be done to first help the village?" These questions have been developed over the years from an assortment of surveys and questionnaires. Dr. Derleth chose these questions because they accurately reflect the key pieces of information that help identify instability in an area from the local perception.

The Analysis phase centers on gaining situational awareness of the sector through four "lenses." The first lens is PMESSI (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information), which is a methodology used to understand the operational background. The second lens is the cultural environment (tribe, clan, religion,

language). The third lens is other factors, such as grievances, resiliencies, events, and key actors. The final lens is local perception which is information gathered through the TCAPF questionnaire during the collection phase.

The Design phase focuses on identifying activities that can actually solve the grievance. After the proper activities have been identified, they will be implemented and their performance and effects will be monitored and evaluated. This was a very simplified version of what a five-day course. However, there are less than six people in the world that can really teach TCAPF. Plans must be made with the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command to not only teach TCAPF but also stability operations in all levels of officer courses (from officer basic course to the Army Command and General Staff College's Intermediate-Level Education program) and non-commissioned officer education systems, from Warrior Leader's Course to the First Sergeants Course). This task shouldn't fall solely on the shoulders of the COIN Academy in Camp Julien, which started its inaugural Stability Course in early November. Ironically, TFS was invited to send a guest instructor to academy to help teach the very people who were going to advise and assist all Task Forces on stability operations- the Counterinsurgency Assist and Advise Teams.

The reason why TFS was the only brigade who had a qualified instructor to send was because of its decentralized networks. TCAPF was identified by the Marines during the previously mentioned lessons learned session as something useful and TFS contracted out for the training in early September. By the time this tool has reached the

Understand the Local Environment

Operating Environment — Cultural Environment — Factors of Instability — Local Perceptions — Major Drivers of Instability

COIN Academy's slide on Analysis

COIN Training Centre - Afghanistan

ears of higher civilian and military leadership, TFS has become one of the leading proponents and users of it.

Over the last one hundred days, TFS has built a network and a reputation that has taken a life of its own. The decentralized fusion cells branch out to combined, joint, and interagency partners. As the fusion cells' network expands and the whole picture comes into view, they stand in a great position to achieve the desired end state.

Centralize Their Network

Revolutionizing TFS's own network is only half of the solution. A careful balance of decentralization has worked well so far in a centralized organization. The next step would be to centralize the district level government. The Governance, Reconstruction, and Development fusion cell's end state is to "build administrative and judicial infrastructure that will deliver security and stability to the population."[121] Enable the government to provide a set of services that the population will come to depend on. The first step to accomplishing this is to establish or improve the district centers. District level officials, along with the ANSF, are the only level of government that the average Afghan sees day to day. Therefore, there needs to be district level officials present in the district centers everyday. Having a great district governor means nothing if his life is in jeopardy. The ANSF's barracks must be placed alongside the district center to include Coalition Forces and mentoring units.

The district center must radiate security and stability to the immediate surrounding population and then to the next largest population center. If there are no district officials then a civil-military push must be made to Kabul to ensure proper staffing. If the district officials aren't qualified then proper training must be provided whether it is in Afghanistan or if it's at the prestigious Civil Services Academy of Pakistan in Lahore.

Future plans for District Center outside Combat Outpost Rath, Maiwand District.

While deserving district officials are out training, Kabul should send down temporary officials, mimicking what the Focused District Development plan of the Ministry of the Interior does. That program brings Afghan National Police to a training academy in order to enhance their capabilities and build the rule of law. Concurrently, the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) comes down to the area where the Afghan National Police just left and serves as the police force while the Afghan National Police are in class. There needs to be the civilian equivalent of "ANCOPs" for district officials while they are out training.

Accomplishing this task requires networks of partners in various capacities and position. TFS's fusion cells continue to grow and learn from their experiences in southern Afghanistan. FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, states, "in COIN, the side that learns faster and adapts more rapidly-the better learning organization-usually wins" and "promoting learning is a key responsibility of commanders at all levels."

The coup de grace is to execute a brigade-wide collaboration session from the team leader above. In TFS, every combat soldier is networked through Land Warrior. Combined, joint, and interagency networks are wired through its decentralized fusion cells. The final step is to connect the combat soldier to the multi-disciplinary field of experts and policy makers in order to have collaboration with partners at every level of war: tactical, operational, and strategic.

---

[121] Ahmed, Akbar. "American has yet to grasp the cost of losing in Afghanistan." Guardian 5 October 2009. http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2009/oct/05/afghanistan-us-strategy-mcchrystal-troops

The Tribal Network

There is a saying in the Canadian Army: "We are tribal." This saying stems from the size of the Canadian Army, approximately 35,000 strong, which makes it easier to network because of its intimate nature. Perhaps that is why Major Claude Villeneuve, a former Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) company commander of the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team, wanted to introduce his relationships with Afghans instead of talking about specific projects. In a tribal society with undeveloped governance, the power of networks has been clearly illustrated. That is why the Canadian Army finds it much easier to translate this experience to its dealing with the Afghans.

The Chinese have a saying too, "You keep the land and lose the people, you lose both. You keep the people and lose the land, you have both." FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, states, "political power is the central issue in insurgencies and counterinsurgencies." Conceivably, it is time to rethink the term "battle-space owner." The military looks at its area of operation as chunks of land with distinct borders. It is time to start looking at population centers and fully appreciate the political nature of the conflict. The Russians owned the land much like Coalition Forces do today. But did they keep the people?

The power of information is so fast and pervasive that it is impossible to control it. Networks come in many forms and it is up to military leaders to find the right balance. There is a clear need for decentralized networks working side by side centralized networks. Decentralized networks create innovation necessary to defeat the enemy. Civil-military networks help tactical commanders in understanding the whole picture and therefore lead to better decision making. After all, "to defeat a network, you have to be a network."

Jonathan Pan is the Economic Development Officer for Task Force Stryker, 5th Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division (SBCT). He is responsible for stabilization efforts and economic development of Kandahar and Zabul provinces in Regional Command South, Afghanistan.

Book Review

White Tigers: My Secret War in North Korea

by Ben S. Malcolm
(Washington, D.C: Brassey's, 1996). ($8.95)

Reviewed by Major Bradford M. Burris, U.S. Army

Although not typically discussed as a "small war", for a few select Americans the Korean Conflict was as much of an unconventional war as Vietnam and the current war in Afghanistan. In *White Tigers: My Secret War in Korea*, retired Army Colonel Ben S. Malcom details his service as a member of the Guerrilla Division of the 8240th Army Unit from January 1952 until February 1953. As a young Lieutenant, Malcom and twenty-five other members of the 8240th trained North Korean partisans to conduct operations against the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) along the western coast of the North Korean mainland.

From a small island compound, Malcom contended with several problems still plaguing today's unconventional warfare practitioners: building relationships with indigenous leaders, over-

coming convoluted command and logistical support structures, mitigating partisan training shortfalls, balancing an advisory role with orders not to engage in combat operations, and finally explaining U.S. policy to a guerrilla force when juxtaposed to their desires.

Malcom's most important task was to develop a relationship with Pak Choll, the North Korean partisan he was tasked to advise. Mr. Pak "was the leader of a group of about six hundred anti-Communist partisan fighters who were members of an American-backed unit known as Donkey-4 (D-4) and who called themselves the 'White Tigers'" (p. 2). Malcom's immediate task was to assess the motivations and loyalties of Mr. Pak who had assumed command of D-4 about a month before Malcom arrived at Leopard Base.