

“restrictive control” and “umpiring” and represents the cornerstone of an industrial-age army’s fighting spirit. Unfortunately, the outcome of the war in Afghanistan will not be decided by a few major strategic or operational victories but by numerous tactical successes, which means that the management team is no greater than the little cog on the ground in physical proximity and direct contact with the LNs. And that is why, now more than ever before, NATO forces need intellectuals in uniform on the ground — individuals able to engage in meaningful dialogue with the LNs and able to build enduring relationships with the local population. We need officers and NCOs capable of employing not violence but legitimate violence whenever the situation calls for it.

The “war as art” method set up by Moltke was truly revolutionary, as it created a military environment that cultivated creativity, improvisation, inventiveness, and open-mindedness. There is no doubt in my mind that this method would have moved beyond the gunslinger culture in asymmetrical conflicts. However, since in protracted high-intensity conflicts, the scientific method prevailed over it, the war as art method was consigned to the history books.

In Afghanistan, we should adopt a balanced way, avoiding two particularly ineffective approaches: the first one is the gunslinger culture, the other one being the negotiation à l’outrance penchant. Both are unproductive. In Afghanistan, legitimate violence is negotiation.

The scientific method has its own military culture — one that cultivates, in Norman Dixon’s words: “an underestimation, sometimes bordering on the arrogant, of the enemy (...), an inability to profit from past experience (...), great physical bravery but little moral courage (...), a love of ‘bull’, smartness, precision, and strict preservation of ‘the military pecking order’ (...), a high regard for tradition and other aspects of conservatism.”

Before we can change the way we do business in Afghanistan, we need to change the very military culture that prevents decision makers in the field from being creative thinkers with a firm grasp of the intricacies of insurgencies acquired through incessant study. We often seem to forget that one of the most successful guerrilla fighters was an intellectual: T.E. Lawrence. His major work, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, should be mandatory reading for Infantry officers.

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TAMING THE DUKES OF AFGHANISTAN

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Colonel Abdul Razziq is currently the executive officer for the 3rd Zone Afghan Border Police. The mission of the border police is to protect the borders of Afghanistan against criminal offenders by providing a law enforcement capability at international borders. They control pedestrian and vehicular traffic at border crossing points, and international airports and are also responsible for aviation security. Razziq oversees the Wesh-Chaman border crossing point, the second busiest port of entry in Afghanistan. Instead of just focusing on his duties as an Afghan border police officer, Razziq has created a fiefdom in Spin Boldak district of Kandahar Province. He is part of a new class of warlords who are more politically and economically savvy than his mujahedeen predecessors. Instead of relying on his guns, he has become the conduit of foreign aid and dominates local governance.

Opponents of Razziq have portrayed him as a warlord who is allegedly into narco-trafficking and is involved in various other forms of corruption. Proponents of Razziq portray him as a fierce fighter of the Taliban (they killed his brother) and a source of stability. Military officers can’t stomach parting with the stability that seems guaranteed with Razziq while foreign service officers feel that having a police official meddling in civil official activities undermines the central government. Combinations from both parties argue that Afghanistan has never been a strong centralized state, and that condition is impossible to change. Nevertheless, a recent essay published in *Foreign Affairs* offers a case study for centralizing state power through dealing with the Razziqs of Afghanistan.

Sheri Berman’s essay, “From the Sun King to Karzai,” which appeared in the magazine’s March-April 2010 issue, proposes that the *ancien régime* serve as a case study for centralizing state power. Before the 17th century, Europe consisted of nothing more than a few kings who ruled capital cities. The dukes and the clergy had the real power outside the capitals. That sounds eerily similar to the Abdul Razziqs, the Matiullah Khans, and the mullahs in Afghanistan today. Consolidation of centralized power “involves destroying, undermining, or co-opting these actors so as to create a single national political authority,” according to Berman.

In 17th-century France, local power brokers were destroyed, undermined, or bribed. Defeating committed opponents proved to be a Pyrrhic victory, so Louis XIV adopted the “co-opting” approach. The palace of Versailles was used as a venue for “political entrepreneurs” to procure and vie for power. The smarter ones eventually came to understand that Versailles was more akin to a white-collar detention facility than anything else. By then, Louis XIV had already broken them.

The first and most vital step to centralized government is to monopolize violence, and that has been achieved to a certain degree in Afghanistan through the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). However, many ANSF units are more loyal to their local power broker than to the country. This comes as no surprise in the volatile south where new police recruits earn \$240 per month compared to the \$600 their rival armed security groups make monthly. Therefore, one solution is to promote or move these local



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Afghan Border Police Colonel Abdul Razziq was featured in a December 2009 article in Harper's Magazine titled "The Master of Spin Boldak."

power brokers away from their political, economic, social, and military power base.

Karzai has demonstrated that he can do this when it is in his favor by moving Gul Agha Sherzai from the post of Governor of Kandahar to the post of Governor of Nangahar. Ironically, by 2009, Sherzai "had become the type of leader Karzai did not want to create: a politician with a base in Kandahar as well as considerable popularity and influence in the east," according to Carl Forsberg in his article "Politics and Power in Kandahar" (*The Institute for the Study of War*, April 2010). Nevertheless, by transitioning the former Afghan National Army lieutenant general into a civilian position, Karzai has forced Sherzai to expand beyond his military power and therefore to a certain degree tied Sherzai's success to the success of the government of Afghanistan. It is uncertain whether promoting Razziq to another province's chief of police or into a civilian position will either propel him into the success that Sherzai has seen or destroy his relevancy. Will Razziq be a better civilian or military leader?

Dr. Mark Moyar puts the leadership issue above all other discourses concerning this war in his article, "Lessons Learned, Lessons Lost," published in the *Small Wars Journal*. This applies to both the military

and the civilian leadership. Recent experiences in Iraq show that host nation armies will prove to be more competent and efficient than the police; this is a direct reflection on their officer corps. In some aspects, the police force is more important than the army. The Afghan National Police has more day-to-day interactions with the Afghan people than any other organization. They are the face of the government. Moyar cites a statistic that in 2007, General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker "helped convince the Iraqi government to relieve seven of nine National Police brigade commanders and more than 2,000 Interior Ministry personnel." He compares this to the replacement of "20

provincial chiefs and 124 district chiefs" from 1968 to 1971 in South Vietnam. Is Razziq a competent colonel? Are the borders of his area of operations really secured? Is ISAF, with both its military and civilian components, capable of influencing his removal if he isn't doing his job?

Foreign intervention with host national military and civilian leadership is often met with accusations of challenging host national sovereignty. Therefore, it is necessary to leverage the silent financial power brokers behind the local power broker. The dukes of Afghanistan are known only because they are in the media spotlight, as evidenced by Razziq being the subject of Matthieu Aikins's article in the December 2009 *Harper's Magazine*, "The Master of Spin Boldak." As the saying goes in Hollywood, there is no such thing as bad publicity. Due to his recent stardom, he has been frequently courted by generals and ambassadors. All the attention on Razziq means less attention on the silent power brokers.

No intelligence analysts truly know the silent financial power brokers behind them. There isn't a concerted effort to dig deeper than the face of corruption. The military knows the importance of networks: defeating the improvised explosive devices (IED) network is almost as important as defeating the IED itself. Yet, intelligence

analysts, especially above the brigade level, continue to expend a significant amount of time and energy on anything but the financial network. Instead, there should be a concerted effort to identify people who can be leveraged: silent financial power brokers. Tactical intelligence assets will in the foreseeable future ignore financial forensics but a separate task force or operational level intelligence asset be dedicated to this endeavor.

MG Michael T. Flynn's article, "A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan," is having an effect on intelligence analysts above the brigade combat level going down to the ground for information. Sadly, the primary source of population-focused information requested so far has been "tribal." A recent Human Terrain System report warns that "'tribal engagement' in Afghanistan ... is based on an erroneous understanding of the human terrain," and, "'Pashtuns' motivations for choosing how to identify and organize politically-including ... 'Tribe' is only one potential choice of identity among many, and not necessarily the one that guides people's decision-making." Another issue is the insular tendencies of the intelligence community for classified information on classified systems. An intelligence analyst in Ottawa recently requested information to be sent via Stoneghost, an allied top secret network (which I had not heard of until that request). Luckily, most "white" activity (the Afghan population, economy, development, and government) are unclassified and therefore can be shared through unclassified systems.

NATO and the Afghan government have failed to politically or militarily destroy, undermine, or co-opt the dukes of Afghanistan into submission. It is time to tame them through economic violence by leveraging their silent financial power brokers or shifting them away from their economic and political base. To achieve this effect, there must be a concerted effort in identifying and leveraging the silent supporters through financial forensics by the intelligence community.

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